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ABSTRACT
Integrated Delivery Systems (IDSs) now become a primary
means of care provision in healthcare domain. However,
existing password systems (under either the single-server
model or the multi-server model) do not provide adequate
security when applied to IDSs. We are thus motivated to
present a practical password authentication system built upon
a novel two-server model. We generalize the two-server
model to an architecture of a single control server supporting
multiple service servers, tailored to the organizational struc-
ture of IDSs. The underlying user authentication and key
exchange protocols we propose are password-only, neat, effi-
cient, and robust against off-line dictionary attacks mounted
by both servers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Security
Keywords
integrated delivery systems (IDSs), password system, user
authentication and key exchange, dictionary attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
The application of information technology to heath care
has driven significant structural changes of the healthcare in-
dustry and its methods of care. Taking U.S. for instance, In-
tegrated Delivery Systems (IDSs) are rapidly becoming the
primary means of care provision [11]. While their forms vary
and will continue to evolve, IDSs generally consolidate un-
der one corporate umbrella multiple types of care providers
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(such as hospitals and primary care clinics) that serve differ-
ent aspects of the care continuum. Some IDSs also include a
health care financing arm that offers health plans and pays
for care. IDSs depend on integrated information systems to
achieve their objectives of cost savings, expansions of mar-
ket share, and improved quality of care. It is however clear
that while the affiliating care providers in an IDS cooperate
with one another, each of them has its own business interest,
providing distinct services.
Since the advent of computers, entry of a user ID followed
by a password has been the most commonly employed means
of user identification and authentication. In a password au-
thentication system, each user shares a password or some
simple password verification data (PVD) derived from the
password with a server, and the user only needs to memo-
rize the password and uses it in user authentication process.
One appealing advantage of using password lies in that it
has little or no actual cost since no associated physical ac-
cessories such as smart cards, sensors, scanners are required.
Password authentication still demonstrates vitality in health
care, especially as wireless healthcare applications are be-
coming increasingly prevalent. We are thus concerned with
applying password authentication in healthcare information
systems, especially in IDSs.
However, password authentication has intrinsic weaknesses,
due primarily to the small space of dictionary where pass-
words are chosen. More specifically, passwords are subject
to brute-force dictionary attacks where an attacker enumer-
ates every possible password in the dictionary to determine
the actual password. The dictionary attacks can occur on-
line or off-line: in an on-line attack, the attacker repeatedly
picks a password from the dictionary and login with it to
the server by impersonating a legitimate user. Every reject
convinces the attacker to eliminate a guess; in an off-line
dictionary attack, the attacker records a past successful lo-
gin between a user and the server, and then checks all the
passwords in the dictionary against the gleaned login tran-
script, until eventually find the correct password. On-line
dictionary attacks can be easily thwarted at the system level
by limiting the number of unsuccessful login attempts made
by a user. In contrast, off-line dictionary attacks are noto-
riously harder to deal with. As a result, tremendous effort
has been dedicated to countering against off-line dictionary
attacks in password systems (e.g., [2, 5, 6, 20, 22, 18, 7, 23,
9]). Most of the existing password systems involve a single
server, assuming the server is completely reliable. Conse-
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quently, these systems are precisely robust to off-line dic-
tionary attacks by outside attackers. As a matter of fact,
the server in these systems can get the password directly or
from the PVD by off-line dictionary attacks.
Unfortunately, a fully trusted server is hard to achieve in
practice, due to either outsider penetrations or unscrupu-
lous insiders such as system administrators. As a result,
deploying single-server password systems in IDSs, that is,
each affiliating care provider in an IDS maintains by itself
a server housing passwords of its users, is not an optimal
practice. This is because (1) some affiliating care providers
may lack sufficient expertise and funds to sustain servers
robust enough against outsider penetrations and insider at-
tacks; (2) it is now a trend that some organizations choose
to outsource their IT management to external specialized
service providers so as to reduce administrative costs. In
such cases, system administrators may present themselves
as a big threat to system security [8]. Solutions to the prob-
lem of unreliable server is to distribute passwords as well
as the verification functionality to multiple servers, so that
an attacker is forced to compromise several servers for the
purpose of off-line dictionary attacks (e.g. [14, 19, 24, 25]).
Clearly, these systems based on multiple servers do not di-
rectly apply to IDSs either, since we cannot expect every
affiliating care provider to afford deploying multiple servers.
We shall further discuss the disadvantages of multi-server
password systems in Section 3.
Considering the organizational structure of IDSs, it is a
natural solution that the corporate authority of an IDS gets
involved into the trust management of its affiliating care
providers. Following this rationale, we present a practi-
cal password authentication system built upon a novel two-
server model: each affiliating care provider operates a front-
end service server, providing services to its users; the corpo-
rate authority manages a back-end control server, whose sole
purpose is to assist the service servers in user authentica-
tion. The two-server system follows the principle of multiple
servers by dispensing passwords and verification functional-
ity to two servers, but distinguishing from other multi-server
systems in that only the service server exposes to users while
the control server stays transparent to the public. Our sys-
tem requires no PKI, which is of particularly advantage con-
sidering PKIs are proven notoriously expensive in real world
deployment. While we discuss the two-server system in the
context of IDSs, it clearly has wider applicability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review related work. In Section 3, we discuss
different server models for password systems and general-
ize the two-server model to the context of IDSs. We then
give a basic two-server password authentication and key ex-
change protocol in Section 4. In Section 5, we improve the
basic protocol by circumventing the weaknesses contained in
it, and in Section 6, we present the third protocol. We give
some discussions on the protocols in Section 7, and Section 8
contains the concluding remarks and future work.
2. RELATED WORK
It is a proven fact that public key techniques (e. g., expo-
nentiations in a multiplicative group) are absolutely neces-
sary to make password systems secure against off-line dic-
tionary attacks, whereas the involvement of public key cryp-
tosystems (e. g., public key encryption and digital signa-
ture schemes) is not essential [18]. This observation dif-
ferentiates two separate approaches to the development of
secure password systems: combined use of password and
public key cryptosystem, and password-only approach. The
former takes into account the asymmetry of capabilities be-
tween users and servers, so a user only uses a password while
the server has a public/private key pair at its disposal. Ex-
amples of such public key-assisted password authentication
systems include [15, 18, 7]. In these systems, the use of
public key cryptosystems entails the deployment and main-
tenance of a PKI for public key certification, and adds to
users the burden of checking key validity. To eliminate this
drawback, password-only protocols, known as password-only
authenticated key exchange or PAKE, have been extensively
studied (e.g., [2, 5, 6, 22, 23, 9]). The PAKE protocols do
not involve any public key cryptosystem and therefore are
much more attractive for real world applications. It is our
belief that any use of public key cryptosystems in a pass-
word system should be avoided, since otherwise the benefits
brought by the use of password would be counteracted to a
great extent.
Most of the existing password systems were designed over
a single server, where each user shares a password or some
PVD with a single authentication server. While these sys-
tems are sufficiently robust against off-line dictionary at-
tacks mounted by outsiders, they are by no means resilient to
attacks initiated at the server side, e.g., in the event of server
break-ins by outsiders or misbehavior by unscrupulous sys-
tem administrators. To address this problem, password sys-
tems based on multiple servers were proposed. The prin-
ciple of such multi-server systems is distributing the pass-
word/PVD database as well as the verification functionality
to multiple servers in order to eliminate the single point
of vulnerability. As such, without compromising multiple
servers, an attacker is bound not to be effective in off-line
dictionary attacks. The idea of splitting a secret into mul-
tiple segments has also been leveraged by several systems
other than the multi-server password systems for other pur-
poses. For example, it was suggested to split a private RSA
signing key into several parts in order to enable “mutlsig-
natures” [1] or to mitigate the catastrophic consequences
of a Kerberos server that houses the secret keys of all its
users being compromised [17]. The system in [14], believed
to be the first multi-server password system, splits a short
password among multiple servers who then collaborate on
user authentication. However, the servers in [14] need to
use public keys. An improved version of [14] was proposed
in [19] which eliminates the use of public keys while achiev-
ing similar security. Further and more rigorous extensions
were due to [24] and [25], where the former built a t-out-of-
n threshold PAKE protocol and provided a formal security
proof under the random oracle model [10], and the latter
presented two provably secure threshold PAKE protocols
under the standard model. While the protocols in [24] and
[25] are theoretically significant, they have low efficiency and
high operational overhead. In these multi-server password
systems, either the servers are equally exposed to the users
and a user has to communicate in parallel with several or
all servers for authentication, or a gateway is introduced
between the users and the servers (see Section 3).
The password system most closely related to ours is the
two-server system recently proposed by Brainard et al. [4],
where one server exposes itself to users and the other is
hidden from the public. While this two-server setting is ef-
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Figure 1: Models of password systems.
ficient, it is not a password-only system: both servers need
to have public keys to protect the communication channels
between users and servers. As we have stressed earlier, this
makes it difficult to fully enjoy the benefits of a password
system. In addition, the system in [4] only performs unilat-
eral authentication and relies on the Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) to establish a session key between a user and the
front-end server. Subsequently, Yang et al. [26] extended
and tailored this two-server system to the context of feder-
ated enterprises, where the back-end server is managed by
an enterprise headquarter and each affiliating organization
operates a front-end server. An improvement made in [26] is
that only the back-end server holds a public key. Neverthe-
less, the system in [26] is still not a password-only system.
We notice that the two-server system presented in [21] does
not follow the two-server model in [4, 26], but is a special
case of multi-server systems. This should be clear shortly in
Section 3. Our work in this paper generalize the two-server
model in [4, 26] to the context of IDSs, and we adopt a very
different method in the protocol design. As a result, our
protocols require no public key cryptosystem whatsoever,
and are quite efficient and neat.
3. A TWO-SERVER MODEL AND ITS AP-
PLICATION TO IDS
Password systems in the literature are generally built over
the following four types of architectures shown in Figure 1.
The first type is the single-server model given in Figure 1(a),
where a single server is leveraged and it keeps a database of
user passwords. As mentioned earlier, most of the existing
password systems follow this single-server model, but the
single server results in a single point of vulnerability with
respect to off-line dictionary attacks against the user pass-
word database.
The second type is the plain multi-server model depicted
in Figure 1(b), in which the server side comprises multi-
ple servers for the purpose of removal of the single point of
vulnerability; the servers are equally exposed to users and
a user has to communicate in parallel with several or all
servers for authentication. Clearly, the main problem with
the plain multi-server model is the demand on communi-
cation bandwidth and the need for synchronization at the
user side, since a user has to engage in simultaneous com-
munications with multiple servers. This may cause problems
to resource constrained mobile devices such as hand phones
and PDAs. The systems in [14, 19, 24] and one of the two
protocols in [25] assume this model.
The third type is the gateway-augmented multi-server model
outlined in Figure 1(c), where a gateway is positioned as a
relaying point between users and servers, and a user only
needs to contact the gateway. Apparently, the introduction
of the gateway removes the demand of simultaneous com-
munications by a user with multiple servers as in the plain
multi-server model. However, the gateway introduces an
additional layer in the architecture, which appears “redun-
dant” since the sole role of the gateway is to relay messages
between users and servers, and it does not in any way involve
in service provision, user authentication and other security
enforcements. From security perspective, more components
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in general imply more points of vulnerabilties. Protocols
based on the gateway-augmented multi-server model include
[25] and [21].
The forth type is the two-server model outlined in Fig-
ure 1(d), that comprises two servers at the server side, one
of which is a public server exposing itself to users and the
other is a back-end server staying behind the scene; users
only contact the public server, but the two servers cooper-
ate to authenticate users. It is important to note the essen-
tial differences between the two-server model and the earlier
multi-server models: (1) in the two-server model, a user ends
up establishing a session key only with the public server, and
the role of the back-end server is merely to assist the pub-
lic server in user authentication; while in the multi-server
models, a user establishes a session key (either different or
same) with each of the servers. For exactly this reason, we
view the two-server system in [21] as a special case of the
gateway-augmented multi-server model of two servers; (2)
from security point of view, servers in the multi-server mod-
els are equally exposed to outside attackers (recall that the
gateway in the gateway-augmented multi-server model does
not enforce security), while in the two-server model, only the
public server faces such a problem. This clearly improves the
server side security and in turn the overall system security
in the two-server model.
It is clear that the two-server model has successfully elim-
inated drawbacks in the plain multi-server model (i.e., si-
multaneous communications between a user and multiple
servers) and the gateway-augmented multi-server model (i.e.,
redundancy), while allows for distribution of user passwords
and the verification functionality to two servers so as to elim-
inate the single point of vulnerability in the single-server
model. As a result, the two-server model appears to be a
sound model for practical applications. We are thus moti-
vated to adapt the two-server model to the context of IDSs.
To that end, we specify that the public server acts as a
service server that provides application services, while the
back-end server is a control server whose sole purpose is to
assist the service server in user authentication (the service
server of course also participates in user authentication).
This enables to enforce clear separation of duty in our sys-
tem. We emphasize that in the plain multi-server model
and the gateway-augmented multi-server model, several or
all servers equally participate in user authentication as well
as service provision (this is implied by the fact that a user
negotiates a session key with each server).
Recall that an IDS is formed by many affiliating care
providers united under a single corporate authority shown in
Figure 2(a), where each affiliating organization serves a dif-
ferent aspect of care provision, has its own business interest,
and has a distinct group of users. We generalize the above
two-server model to an architecture of a single control server
supporting multiple service servers outlined in Figure 2(b).
As such, application of this generalized architecture to an
IDS is as follows: the corporate authority of the IDS man-
ages the control server, and each affiliating care provider
operates a service server that provides a certain care service
to its own users.
The two-server model we employ together with its appli-
cation to IDSs enjoys many advantages:
• A single point of vulnerability as in the single-server
model is totally eliminated. In principle, without com-
promising both servers no attacker can find user pass-
words through off-line dictionary attacks. On the other
hand, as the control server is isolated from the public,
the chance for it being attacked is substantially min-
imized, thereby increasing server side security and in
turn security of the overall system.
• It decreases the demand of bandwidth as well as syn-
chronization at the user side since users do not engage
in simultaneous communication with multiple servers.
This is of particular importance when supporting wire-
less healthcare applications.
• In an IDS, the corporate authority naturally assumes
strong security expertise and sufficient funds, and is
thus in a much better position to operate and maintain
the control server. Without the worry of a single point
of vulnerability, the affiliating care providers that op-
erate service servers are oﬄoaded to some extent from
strict security management, so they can dedicate their
limited expertise and resources to their core competen-
cies and to enhancing service provision to the users.
• From the perspective of users, they are offered a way
to assume the higher creditability of an IDS as a whole,
while engaging business with individual affiliating care
providers.
It is clear that we have involved the corporate authority of
an IDS into the (partial) trust management of its affiliating
care providers. One may wonder why we simply delegate
full trust management of the affiliating care providers to the
corporate authority. First, in practice each affiliating care
provider has its own business interest, hence it has a stake
to involve into the trust management of its own; second and
more importantly, one of the main objectives of our system
is to eliminate a single point of vulnerability. Adversaries
take on a variety of forms in the real world, and no security
measures and precautions can guarantee that a system will
never be penetrated.
4. A BASIC TWO-SERVER PASSWORD AU-
THENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE
PROTOCOL
As discussed earlier, the existing password protocols upon
the two-server model such as [4, 26] are not password only
systems and have weaknesses. In this and the next two sec-
tions, we present practical password authentication and key
exchange protocols following the two-server model and the
generalized architecture. In particular, we propose three
protocols: the first protocol is based on a security model
that assumes the service server is controlled by an active
adversary while the control server is controlled by a passive
adversary; the second protocol assumes the same security
model but circumvents some weaknesses contained in the
first protocol; the third protocol strengthens the security
model such that both servers are controlled by active adver-
saries. All protocols are password-only, requiring no public
key cryptosystem. We stress that each of these protocols
suffices for practical use and is of independent interest. We
start by listing the notations that are used in the sequel in
Table 1.
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Figure 2: (a) Organizational architecture of IDSs (b) Generalization of the
two-server model to IDSs
Table 1: Notations
Q, p, q Three large primes such that Q = 2p + 1 and p =
2q + 1.
g1, g2 g1, g2 ∈ QRp are of order q and the discrete loga-
rithms to each other are not known, where QRp is
the group of quadratic residues modulo p.
g3 g3 ∈ QRQ is of order p.
π A user’s password.
h(.) A cryptographic hash function modelled as the ran-
dom oracle [10].
U , SS, CS Identity of user, service sever and control server, re-
spectively.
4.1 System Model
Three types of entities are involved in the protocol, i.e.,
users, service servers, and a control server. They are orga-
nized following the generalized architecture in Figure 2(b),
and each pair of a service server and the control server fol-
lows the two-server model in Figure 1(d). In this setting, a
user U only communicates with the service server SS he reg-
istered to and does not necessarily know the control server
CS. For the purpose of user authentication and key ex-
change, U uses a short password which is transformed into
two long secrets, which are held by SS and CS, respectively.
Based on their respective shares, SS and CS together vali-
date users during user login.
We assume the following security model for this proto-
col: CS is controlled by a passive adversary and SS is con-
trolled by an active adversary, in terms of off-line dictionary
attacks to user passwords, but they do not collude (other-
wise it is equal to the single-server model). By definition
(e.g., [16]), a passive adversary follows honest-but-curious
behavior, that is, it honestly executes the protocol accord-
ing to the protocol specifications and does not modify data;
but it eavesdrops on communication channels, collects pro-
tocol transcripts and tries to derive user passwords from the
transcripts; moreover, when a passive adversary controls a
server, it knows all internal states of and knowledge known
to the server including the long term secret key materials (if
any) and user password shares. In contrary, an active adver-
sary can act arbitrarily in order to uncover user passwords.
In addition, we assume a secret communication channel be-
tween SS and CS. We shall discuss how to remove this
assumption in the subsequent protocols.
Note that in this security model, while the control server
acting as a passive adversary is a relatively strong assump-
tion, it is quite reasonable considering the positioning of the
servers in the two-server model and the application scenario
of the model in IDSs. First, the control server is clearly more
trustworthy than the service server in the two-server model
as we discussed earlier. Second, consider the application
scenario of the two-server model in IDSs, where the control
server supports multiple service servers and is managed by
the corporate authority: on the one hand, the control server
deserves more investment for a higher level of security, since
it supports multiple service servers; on the other hand, the
corporate authority affords investing more upon the control
server, since the corporate authority presumably has more
funds and security expertise.
4.2 A High Level Description
Central to our protocol design is to counter against off-line
dictionary attacks by the servers when they are controlled
by adversaries. The intuition is to “harden” a user’s short
password π into two long shares π1 and π2 in such a way that
each of them is no longer subject to off-line dictionary at-
tacks, and then distribute the shares to the two servers. As
a consequence, an attacker cannot succeed in off-line dictio-
nary attacks without grabbing both shares by compromising
both servers. During user login, the control server CS using
its share π2 assists the service server SS using π1 in user au-
thentication. More specifically, in an out-of-band user reg-
istration phase, user U splits his password π into two long
random secrets π1 and π2, and registers them to SS and
CS, respectively, where π1 + π2 = π. During user authenti-
cation, U using π and SS using π1 authenticate each other
and negotiate a secret session key, with the help of CS who
uses π2.
4.3 User Registration
In any password system, to enrol as a legitimate user in
a service, a user must beforehand register to the service
provider by establishing a password with the provider. In
our system, U needs to register to not only the actual service
provider SS but also the control server CS. Suppose U has
already successfully identified to SS, e.g., by showing his
identity card, U splits his password π into two long number
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U SS CS
Input: π input: π1 Input: π2
M1: U, Req−−−−−−−−→ M2: U, SS−−−−−−−−−→
b1 ∈R Zq , B1 = gb11 gπ12 b2 ∈R Zq , B2 = gb21 gπ22
M3: B2←−−−−−−−−−
B = B1B2
M4: B←−−−−−−−−
a ∈R Zq , A = ga1
Su = (B/gπ2 )a = ga(b1+b2)1
Su = h(Su) = h(ga(b1+b2)1 )
M5: A, Su−−−−−−−−→
S1 = Ab1
M6: A, Su, S1−−−−−−−−−−→
S2 = Ab2
Su ?= h(S1S2)
M7: S2←−−−−−−−−−−
Su ?= h(S1S2)
Ss = h(0, S1S2)
M8: Ss←−−−−−−−−−
h(0, Su) ?= Ss K = h(U ,SS, S1S2)
K = h(U ,SS, Su)
Figure 3: A Basic Password Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol.
π1 ∈R Z∗q and π2 ∈R Z∗q such that π1 + π2 = π (mod q),
where q is a prime defined in Table 1. U then registers in a
secure way π1 and π2 to SS and CS, respectively. SS stores
(U , π1) to its secret user account database, and CS stores
(U , π2, SS) to its secret user account database. A user may
register to different service servers, so CS must bind the
user identity U to the service server SS it registered to in
the user account. This completes the user registration step.
Recall however that CS stays hidden from U , then one may
wonder how U registers π2 to CS. This actually is not a
problem in practice: U can reach CS (actually the corporate
authority that manages CS) through out-of-band channels,
such as postal mail. Indeed, imagine that a user enrols in
a medical clinic, it is not strange at all that the user still
needs to submit a secret to a higher authority of the clinic
so as to activate his account.
4.4 Protocol
Let p, q, g1, g2 and h(.) be defined in Table 1, we out-
line the basic password authentication protocol in Figure 3,
which enables mutual authentication and key exchange be-
tween U and SS. In the figure, we omitted the modulo p
notation for arithmetic operations, as this should be clear
from the context.
Let us take a close look at the protocol step by step. To
initiate a request for service, U sends his identity together
with a service request Req to SS in M1. SS first relays
the request to CS in M2, and then selects a random num-
ber b1 ∈R Zq and computes B1 = gb11 gπ12 (mod p) using his
password share π1. Upon receiving M2, CS chooses a ran-
dom number b2 ∈R Zq and computes B2 = gb21 gπ22 (mod p)
using his password share π2. CS then sends B2 inM3 to SS.
Upon reception of B2, SS computes and sends B = B1B2
(mod p) to U inM4. After receivingM4, U selects a ∈R Zq,
and computes A = ga1 (mod p), Su = (B/gπ2 )a = ga(b1+b2)1
(mod p) and Su = h(Su), respectively. U then sends A
and Su to SS in M5. Getting the message, SS computes
S1 = Ab1 (mod p) and sends S1, A and Su to CS in M6.
Upon receipt of M6, CS computers S2 = Ab2 (mod p) and
checks whether Su ?= h(S1S2) = h(ga(b1+b2)1 ): if it holds, CS
is assured of the authenticity of U , and continues the pro-
tocol by sending S2 to SS in M7; otherwise, CS aborts the
protocol.
Assuming SS receives S2 in M7, it checks whether Su ?=
h(S1S2): if it holds, SS is convinced of the authenticity of
U . At this stage, both servers have authenticated U . SS
then computes Ss = h(0, S1S2), and sends Ss to U in M8
and afterwards computes a session key K = h(U ,SS, S1S2);
otherwise, SS aborts the protocol. Upon receiving M8, U
checks if h(0, Su) ?= Ss: if it holds, U has validated the
servers and then computes a session key K = h(U ,SS, Su);
otherwise, U aborts the protocol.
4.5 Security Analysis
In what follows, we analyze security of the basic proto-
col. Our analysis is based on the following Decisional Deffie-
Hellman (DDH) assumption [3]:
DDH Assumption: let p, q be defined as in Table 1, and
g, h ∈R QRp, for every probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm A, the following condition is satisfied:
AdvDDHG (A) = |Pr[A(g, h, gr, hr)]− Pr[A(g, h, gr, z)]| < 
where r ∈R Zq, z ∈R QRp, and  is a negligible function.
Informally speaking, it is computationally intractable for A
to distinguish between (g, h, gr, hr) and (g, h, gr, z).
Recall that the primary goal of our protocol is to resist
off-line dictionary attacks by the two servers, where CS is
controlled by a passive adversary and SS is controlled by
an active adversary. Accordingly, We examine the protocol
against CS, SS and an active outside adversary that does
not control any server, respectively.
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CLAIM 1. The protocol is robust against off-line dictionary
attacks by CS as a passive adversary.
Proof. Intuitively, when CS is controlled by a passive
adversary, it may eavesdrop on the communication channels
to collect protocol transcript and try to launch off-line dic-
tionary attacks against the password of U . Clearly CS can
obtain B1 = B/B2 = gb11 gπ12 (mod p) from M4. However,
from B1 alone, CS cannot learn anything on π1 in an infor-
mation theoretic sense. What remains relevant to CS for off-
line dictionary attacks are [A = ga1 , Su = h((B/gπ2 )a)] and
[S1 = Ab1 , B1 = gb11 gπ12 ]. The first pair is clearly no easier
than [A = ga1 , Su = (B/gπ2 )a] for CS to deal with in terms
of off-line dictionary attacks, we thus suppose CS knows
Su for ease of analysis. Note that A = ga1 ⇒ g1 = Aa
−1
(mod p) and Su = (B/gπ2 )a ⇒ B/gπ2 = Sa
−1
u (mod p). Un-
der the DDH assumption, CS cannot distinguish between
[A, g1 = Aa−1 , Su, B/gπ2 = Sa
−1
u ] and [A, Aa
−1
, Su,
z], where z ∈R QRp. This suggests that CS cannot get
anything on π from the first pair. For the second pair,
B1 = gb11 gπ12 ⇒ B/gπ12 = gb11 (mod p), and again under
the DDH assumption, CS cannot distinguish between [A,
S = Ab1 , g1, B/gπ12 = gb11 ] and [A, Ab1 , g1, z]. This shows
that CS cannot learn anything on π1 from the second pair.
Consequently, CS, controlled by a passive adversary, cannot
be effective in off-line dictionary attacks. This completes
the proof.
It is important to note that in the above analysis, we
have implicitly assumed that CS does not know a = log gA1
(mod q). However, were CS controlled by an active adver-
sary, such an assumption would no longer hold, since CS
could simply impersonate U , choose a and compute A = ga1
(mod p). CS could also break the system if it were able to
replace the original A from U with another one based on an
a of its choice. In both cases, CS could find the password π
by off-line dictionary attacks. To see this, consider the sec-
ond pair where CS knows a = log gA1 and the Diffie-Hellman
quadruple [A, S1 = Ab1 , g1, B2/gπ12 = gb11 ]. It follows that
(B2/gπ12 )a = (B2/gπ−π22 )a = Ab1 = S1, so CS could try
every possible password to determine the actual π with the
knowledge of π2. This explains at the technical level why
CS is assumed to act as a passive adversary.
Observe that CS relies on direct computation of ga(b1+b2)1
(mod p) to validate the authenticity of U , and SS and U
use the same data to authenticate each other and negotiate
a secret session key. This suggests that if CS were an active
adversary, it could establish a session key in the name of
SS. This is another reason for CS being passive.
CLAIM 2. The protocol is robust against off-line dictionary
attacks by SS as an active adversary.
Proof. First, if controlled by a passive adversary, of help
for SS in terms of off-line dictionary attacks is [A = ga1 ,
Su = h((B/gπ2 )a)] and [S2 = Ab2 , B2 = gb21 gπ22 ]. Follow-
ing a similar analysis as for CS, we can show that SS is
unable to learn anything on either π or π2 from the two
pairs. What remains to consider is when SS launches active
attacks, in which case SS may behave arbitrarily such as
impersonating U , modifying and replacing messages. From
the security analysis for CS, we know that if SS replaces A
coming from U with ga1 based on his choice of a and if this is
not detected by CS, SS can obtain π by off-line dictionary
attacks. Fortunately, different from the case of CS, this at-
tack cannot succeed for the following reasons: S2 is sent to
SS in M7 only after CS has already decided on the validity
of Su ?= h(S1Ab2); it is not possible for SS to change A
and also make Su ?= h(S1Ab2) pass the test of CS. As a re-
sult, as an active attacker, SS is still not effective in off-line
dictionary attacks.
CLAIM 3. The protocol is secure against an active outside
adversary controlling no server.
Proof. Attacks by an active outside adversary who does
not control any server include off-line dictionary attacks
against user passwords and attempt to acquire the session
key K established between U and SS. For the former, in-
tuitively such an adversary clearly is no more effective than
SS. For the latter, the adversary could do as follows: (1)
to impersonate any of U , SS and CS. Clearly this requires
the adversary to derive any of π, π1 and π2 by off-line dic-
tionary attacks in order for a successful impersonation; (2)
computing the value of ga(b1+b2)1 (mod p) from the proto-
col transcript. Of help to this end are Su, Ss, S1 and S2.
Obviously inverting Su and Ss is impossible if the underly-
ing hash function is secure. On the other hand, since the
communication channel between SS and CS is secret, the
attacker cannot observe S1 and S2.
It is interesting to notice that given only one of S1 and S2
does not help the attacker in computing ga(b1+b2)1 . There-
fore, one-way secrecy of the channel between SS and CS
suffices to guarantee the secrecy of the session key.
5. AN IMPROVED PROTOCOL
There have two weaknesses in the above basic protocol.
The first one is obvious by recalling that we assumed a se-
cret channel between SS and CS in the system model. The
second one is that CS can compute the session key estab-
lished between U and SS, so CS could get to know the data
exchanged between them. While CS is a passive adversary,
this clearly affects the “need to know” principle. To address
these weaknesses, recall an earlier observation that one-way
secrecy of the channel between U and SS actually suffices
in the above basic protocol. Our solution indeed takes ad-
vantage of this observation by SS concealing Ab1 (mod p)
from CS while still enabling CS to accomplish the task of
user authentication.
The system setting and the security model are the same
as in the basic protocol, except that no secret communica-
tion channel between SS and CS is assumed. Suppose U has
already registered π1 to SS and π2 to CS as in the above
protocol, we present an improved password authentication
protocol in Figure 4, where the system parameters are de-
fined in Table 1, and arithmetic operations associating with
g1 and g2 are modulo p, while operations associating with
g3 are modulo Q.
By checking it against the basic protocol in Figure 3, it
is not hard to understand this improved protocol. So we do
not repeat the process of the protocol execution. Next, we
first check correctness of the protocol.
5.1 Correctness
For the purpose of verifying U , CS needs to check Su ?=
h(SAb21 (mod Q)), and SS needs to check Su ?= h(SS21 (mod Q)).
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U SS CS
Input: π input: π1 Input: π2
M1: U, Req−−−−−−−−→ M2: U,SS−−−−−−−−−→
b1 ∈R Zq , B1 = gb11 gπ12 b2 ∈R Zq , B2 = gb21 gπ22
M3: B2←−−−−−−−−−
B = B1B2
M4: B←−−−−−−−−
a ∈R Zq , A = ga1
Su = (B/gπ2 )a = ga(b1+b2)1
Su = h(gS

u
3 )
M5: A, Su−−−−−−−−→
S1 = g(A
b1 )
3
M6: A, Su, S1−−−−−−−−−−→
S2 = Ab2
Su ?= h(SS21 )
M7: S2←−−−−−−−−−−
Su ?= h(SAb12 )
Ss = h(Ab1S2)
M8: Ss←−−−−−−−−−
h(Su) ?= Ss K = h(U ,SS, Ab1S2)
K = h(U ,SS, Su)
Figure 4: An Improved Password Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol.
To make the checks work, it must hold that g(g
a(b1+b2)
1 mod p)
3
(mod Q) = g(g
ab1
1 mod p)(g
ab2
1 mod p)
3 (mod Q). However, nor-
mally ga(b1+b2)1 (mod p) = (gab11 mod p)(gab21 mod p), but
it hods that ga(b1+b2)1 (mod p) = (gab11 mod p)(gab21 mod p)
(mod p). As g3 ∈ QRQ is of order p, the above checks thus
hold.
5.2 Security
We now examine security of the improved protocol. This
protocol is quite similar to the basic protocol, except for the
introduction of computations associating with g3. It is clear
that this change makes it no easier (nor harder in fact) to
CS and SS for off-line dictionary attacks. We thus focus on
the effect of removal of the secret channel between SS and
CS, and whether CS can compute the session key between
U and SS. Clearly, the removal of the secret channel would
in principle facilitate outside adversaries who do not control
any server for deriving the session key between U and SS.
Compared to the basic protocol, an outside adversary
additionally gleans S1 = g(A
b1 )
3 (mod Q) and S2 = Ab2
(mod p). The adversary needs to know Ab1 (mod p) in or-
der to derive the session key. However, the additional datum
S1 = g(A
b1 )
3 (mod Q) does not further help the adversary
compute Ab1 (mod p), which is clearly equivalent to com-
puting the discrete logarithm of S1. This suggests that the
removal of the secret channel between SS and CS does not
in fact facilitate an outside adversary. For exactly the same
reason, CS cannot compute the session key with the knowl-
edge of S1 either.
As a result, we have managed to remove the weaknesses
contained in the basic protocol.
6. THE THIRD PASSWORD AUTHENTICATED
PROTOCOL
Recall that the security model underlying the earlier two
protocols assumes that the control server can only be con-
trolled by a passive adversary. As we have claimed, this
assumption, while strong, is quite logical considering the
positioning of the two servers in the two-server model and
the application of the model to IDSs. The earlier two proto-
cols, especially the second one thus suffice when applied to
IDSs. It is however clear that weakening of the assumption
that the control server can only be controlled by a passive
adversary is of both practical and theoretical significance.
Consequently, the security model for the third protocol is
that both SS and CS are controlled by active adversaries
and they do not collude. Moreover, no secret communica-
tion channel is assumed. Based on the second protocol in
Figure 4, we present the third protocol in Figure 5.
By referring to the second protocol, it is not hard to un-
derstand and check the correctness of this protocol. So we
do not repeat the protocol execution and the correctness
checking of the protocol, and only focus on its security in
what follows.
6.1 Security Analysis
A main difference between the second protocol in Fig-
ure 4 and this protocol is the additional two messages M5
and M6 between U and SS. We however notice that these
messages themselves do not leak more information on the
password π. We thus only concern with the case when CS is
controlled by an active adversary. From the security anal-
ysis for the earlier two protocols, we know that CS can be
successful in off-line dictionary attacks towards SS when it
knows a = log gA1 (mod q) in the earlier two protocols. The
vulnerability actually results from the fact that U itself takes
full charge of computing A, which allows CS to replace A
or to impersonate U against SS. In this final protocol, the
additional two messages M5 and M6 actually regulate A˜
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U SS CS
Input: π input: π1 Input: π2
M1: U, Req−−−−−−−−→ M2: U,SS−−−−−−−−→
b1 ∈R Zq , B1 = gb11 gπ12 b2 ∈R Zq , B2 = gb21 gπ22
M3: B2←−−−−−−−−−
B = B1B2
M4: B←−−−−−−−−
a, a0 ∈R Zq A = ga1
Sˆu = (B/gπ2 )a0 = ga0(b1+b2)1
M5: A, Sˆu−−−−−−−−→
a1 ∈R Zq , S¯u = Sˆa1u
M6: S¯u←−−−−−−−−
Su = S¯
a−10 au = gaa1(b1+b2)1
Su = h(gS

u
3 )
M7: Su−−−−−−−−→
A˜ = Aa1 , S1 = gA˜b13
M8: A˜, Su, S1−−−−−−−−−−→
Su ?= h(SA˜b21 )
S2 = A˜b2
M9: S2←−−−−−−−−−−
Su ?= h(SS21 )
Ss = h(A˜b1S2)
M10: Ss←−−−−−−−−
h(Su) ?= Ss K = h(U, SS, A˜b1S2)
K = h(U, SS, Su)
Figure 5: Another Password Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol.
(which is equivalent to A in the earlier two protocols) to be
constructed by both U and SS. As a result, while CS, as an
active adversary, can manipulate the part due to U (i.e., a)
by replacement or impersonation, it cannot manipulate the
part due to SS (i.e., a1). That is, CS cannot compute the
discrete logarithm of A˜ to the base g1, and thus is not effec-
tive in off-line dictionary attacks as analyzed in the earlier
two protocols.
A potential weakness of the protocol lies in that an ac-
tive outside adversary between U and SS can influence the
session key shared by U and SS. To see this, the adversary
could choose a random number β ∈R Zq and intercept M5;
then compute A = Aβ (mod p), Sˆu = Sˆβu (mod p), and con-
tinue the protocol by sending the manipulated elements A
and Sˆu to SS as in the original protocol; other part of the
protocol remains intact. It is easy to check that the proto-
col still works, but U and SS ends up sharing a session key
K = h(U, SS, gaa1β(b1+b2)1 ), which is distinct from the one
perceived in the original protocol. We however notice that
attacks of this kind do not affect the secrecy of the session
key and the user password, nor do they affect the authenti-
cation functionality of the protocol. The adversary gains no
advantages from such attacks. We therefor do not consider
them as a serious issue.
7. DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first examine performance of our pro-
posed protocols. Let |p| and |h| denote the bit length of
p and the hash function h(.), respectively, we outline the
performance results in Figure 6. We have three aspects to
evaluate. (1) Computation performance: as exponentiation
operations dominate each party’s overhead, we only count
the number of exponentiations as the computation perfor-
mance, and the digits following / denote the number of ex-
ponentiations that can be computed off-line. Note that by
leveraging on the techniques in [12], each of gb11 gπ12 (mod p)
and gb21 gπ22 (mod p) can be computed by a single exponen-
tiation. (2) Communication performance in terms of bits:
as |Q| is only 1 bits longer than |p|, we do not explicitly
distinguish between |p| and |Q| for ease of comparison. In
addition, we have neglected including the bandwidth of M1
and M2 in this aspect of calculation. (3) Communication
performance in terms of rounds: one round represents a one
way transmission of messages.
  















  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 6: Performance of the proposed protocols.
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From the table, it shows that the proposed protocols are
in general quite efficient in terms of both computation and
communication to all parties. Take U for example, it needs
to calculate 3, 4 and 5 exponentiations in the three proto-
cols, respectively, and 2 of them can be performed off-line
in all cases; the communication overhead for U is also quite
low in terms of both bits and rounds. As a result, our pro-
tocols can readily apply to wireless applications. It is also
worth noticing from the table that our proposed protocols
favor the generalized architecture for IDSs where one control
server supports multiple service servers, since the workload
in terms of both computation and communication upon the
control server is particularly low. Of course, with sufficient
funds the corporate authority of an IDS can always deploy
a powerful server.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in our protocols, a
password is splitted into two random shares; therefore, a
user can use the same password to register to different ser-
vice servers, either they connect to distinct control servers or
to the same control server. This is a highly desirable feature
since it makes the system user friendly. A big inconvenience
in the traditional password systems is that a user has to
memorize different passwords for different applications.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Use of password is still a vital means of user authentica-
tion in healthcare information systems, especially as wire-
less healthcare applications are becoming increasingly preva-
lent. However, existing password systems have difficulties
when applied to IDSs, the current primary means of care
provision. To solve this problem, we presented a practi-
cal password authentication system based on a novel two-
server model, and generalized the model to an architecture
of a single control server supporting multiple service servers
by considering the organizational structure of IDSs. The
underlying user authentication and key exchange protocols
we proposed are password-only, neat, efficient, and robust
against off-line dictionary attacks mounted by both servers.
While we examined the security of the proposed proto-
cols, a formal treatment of the system is necessary. One
of our future work is thus to formally define and validate
the security of the system. Another direction of the future
work consists of investigating other issues associated with
password authentication such as phishing attacks [13].
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